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Abstract 
‘When’ is the Anthropocene and who are its subjects? This article explores the political 
stakes of the frameworks mobilised to answer this question at a pivotal moment when the 
dominant meaning and implications of the concept of the Anthropocene are still in flux. The 
article seeks to demonstrate the ways in which engaging with the question of the ‘who’ of the 
Anthropocene also entails assumptions about the ‘when’ which rely on a transposition of 
geological onto historical and political periodization. The idea of the Anthropocene as a new 
epoch, with the associated focus on appropriate starting dates, novelty, and periodization, 
raises difficulties for attempts to construct alternatives to the ecologically problematic 
temporal discourse of modernity, the subjects thereby produced, and the critical resources 
with which to engage these. The inscription of these temporal boundaries in the anthropocene 
debate provides a framework which limits attempts to engage with the mobility of the 
human/nature border and associated arguments for an expanded (in both spatial and species 
terms) political constituency through which to engage the ecological challenges of the 
anthropocene. Such a framework obscures the ways in which the non-human is already 
integral to dominant political conceptual structures and the article proposes that instead of a 
focus on whether the non-human can/should be brought into an Anthropocene politics, we 














The idea that we have entered a new geological epoch in which humanity is remaking the 
geological structure of the planet—the Anthropocene—has rapidly gained currency since its 
popularisation in a 2000 article by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer. The concept of ‘the 
Anthropocene’ is increasingly employed as a marker of novelty or a paradigm shift 
(Hamilton, 2015; Maslin and Lewis, 2015; Johnson and Morehouse, 2014) that animates 
demands for new perspectives on the problem of climate change, in media reporting (e.g. 
Macfarlane, 2016), popular science (e.g. Kolbert, 2014) and academic literature in the 
sciences (Bai et al, 2016; Steffen et al, 2011; Zalasiewicz et al, 2017) and social sciences and 
humanities (Burke et al, 2016; Clark, 2014). In this article I argue that contemporary attempts 
to harness the novelty of the Anthropocene as geological epoch to prompt a 
reconceptulisation of the political implications of the changing relationship between the 
human and natural that it describes are problematic. We need, I argue, to pause and re-
examine the particular mapping of geological temporality onto political temporality in what 
is fast becoming a commonplace claim about the Anthropocene; that the world has entered a 
new geological epoch in which the human and natural can no longer be distinguished.  
 
A number of scholars have characterised the Anthropocene in terms of a disjuncture between 
the human as geologically active but politically passive (e.g. Last, 2017; Swyngedouw, 
2013), even in light of innovative, provocative and far reaching manifestos for political action 
on climate change (e.g. Burke et al, 2016). In response, a growing body of ‘critical 
Anthropocene’ research located at the intersection of Political Geography, International 
Relations, Security studies and Environmental Humanities to which this article contributes 
offers a focus on the production of subjectivities in the light of the human/nature 
destabilisation (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011; Fagan, 2017; Mitchell, 2014; Ruddick, 2015, 
2017; Yusoff and Clark, 2017; Yusoff, 2013, 2014), insights into the political implications of 
different starting points for the Anthropocene (Harrington, 2016; Hamilton, 2014; 
Szerszynski, 2017) and associated critiques of the concept as anthropocentric, capital-centric, 
and universalising (e.g. Crist, 2013; Haraway, 2015; Yusoff, 2014). These approaches to 
subjectivity have led to a series of important calls for consideration of a larger political 
constituency when engaging with questions of political ecology; theorisation of interspecies 
relations (Youatt, 2014) of the non-human (Crist, 2013; Burke et al, 2016; Latour, 2015; 
Yusoff, 2013), and the posthuman (Fishel, 2017; McDonald, 2017; Rothe, 2017). They have 
also led to related calls for a broader or more complex spatial imaginary—a move to 
planetary, rather than local, national, or global spaces of political and ethical imagination 
(Burke et al, 2016: 504; Ruddick, 2017). 
 
In responding to these important calls however, I argue that invoking the Anthropocene leads 
to an additional layer of complexity because its temporal delineation makes it difficult to 
think expansively about subjectivity or space. Despite a growing body of critical work on 
Anthropocene subjectivities and geographies, there is relatively little on the effects of its use 
as a temporal marker. Questions addressing the ‘when’ of the Anthropocene are framed in 
terms of when and if it has started (Lewis and Maslin, 2015; Steffen et al, 2015; Zalasiewicz 
et al, 2015; Hamilton, 2015; Oldfield, 2015) and the politics of particular starting points 
(Harrington, 2016; Lewis and Maslin, 2015; Yusoff, 2013; Chakrabarty, 2009). However, in 
considering the implications of adopting any one particular starting date for the production of 
subjectivities the related question of the effects of starting dates themselves is somewhat 
neglected. The link between how we conceptualise the question of ‘when’ (through the 
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framework of starting points, periodization, historical, deep or geological time) and the 
subjects and spaces this produces is currently under-theorised. In response, this article 
explores the way in which the Anthropocene’s embeddness in geological accounts of 
temporality contributes to the limits in political imagination and action identified above.  
 
My approach starts from the idea that times are worlds; that different temporalities are 
distinct worlds (Nancy, 1997; Agamben, 2004). I treat claims about times as claims about 
worlds in order to interrogate the danger that the Anthropocene concept, for all its critical 
potential, also reproduces a discourse of linear time in which, through the meshing of 
geological and historical accounts of temporality, it is treated as marking a stage in 
‘progression’ or ‘succession’. I argue that the temporal delineation of the Anthropocene 
epoch entails a mapping of the world-historical present which relies on and reproduces 
exclusionary accounts of the human in determining what is proper to politics. It does this 
through a reliance on a linear account of time which obscures plural pasts and renders plural 
presents anachronistic. The dominant mobilization of the Anthropocene thus contributes to a 
socio-spatial displacement of problematic processes and by-products of contemporary 
Western postindustrial societies, compounds this by obscuring the histories that would make 
them visible, and excludes from politics the people they rely upon and affect (Jackson, 2013; 
Mirzoeff, 2018; Povinelli, 2016; Whyte, 2018).  
 
The first part of the article seeks to demonstrate the ways in which engaging with the 
question of the ‘who’ of the Anthropocene also entails, and sometimes obscures, a series of 
assumptions and boundary devices around the ‘when’ which rely on historical thinking and 
periodization. I first outline some of the complexities that arise in approaching the politics of 
the Anthropocene primarily in terms of its displacement of the human/nature distinction and 
associated argument for an expanded (in both spatial and species terms) political 
constituency. I suggest that such a focus obscures the ways in which the non-human is 
already integral to dominant political conceptual structures and that instead of a focus on 
whether the non-human can/should be brought into an Anthropocene politics, we need first to 
re-examine how it already is. 
  
I then show how current mobilisations of the concept of the Anthropocene limit such a 
reconceptualization of how we might engage with the non-human through reproducing and 
relying on a series of temporal assumptions about human and natural time which in turn 
reproduce a modern political subject. I trace this production through the current debate on 
potential starting dates for the Anthropocene, which is the dominant way in which questions 
of time are currently engaged in Anthropocene work. I then explore what is at stake in the 
specific kinds of temporal thinking identified, through a focus on the themes of novelty, 
periodization, and epochalisation and the relationship between geological and historical time. 
The article concludes with a suggestion that rather than seeking to expand our conceptual 
categories beyond the human there is scope to turn the geological timescales opened up by 
the Anthropocene concept inwards to engage with the plural pasts of that human and 
reconfigure its contemporary constitutions, and in so doing to destabilise the temporal 
structures by which dominant accounts of the political subject are bound. 
 
The Politics of the Non-Human 
 
The dominant way in which the implications of the Anthropocene have been understood in 
critical interdisciplinary literature on the Anthropocene as produced by scholars working at 
intersections of Political Geography, International Relations (IR) and critical social and 
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political thought is through the challenge that it poses to the human/nature binary (see for 
example Dalby, 2017; Harrington, 2016; Lövbrand et al, 2015; Wakefield, 2014; Burke et al, 
2016) and the politics of modernity reliant on this binary (e.g. Johnson and Morehouse, 
2014). 
 
Such approaches tend to suggest that to conceive of the environment or of ecological 
problems in terms of the natural is problematic and that instead a focus is needed on the 
complex entanglements of the human and non-human which make them ‘indistinguishable’ 
(Burke et al, 2016: 510; Harrington, 2016). That is, what is required is to stop thinking about 
the world in terms of a ‘natural’ backdrop to human activity, which it has, in any case, never 
been (Dalby, 2017). The human needs to be understood instead as part of a complex 
ecological web of the natural and social (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011; Burke et al, 2016) in 
which, as Harrington (2016: 490) argues ‘everything is simultaneously human and natural’. 
The Anthropocene thereby ruptures, on this account, the human/nature binary and means that 
‘the concepts of self and other fade away’ (Harrington, 2016: 490).  
 
However, to rethink the relation between human and natural, as any conceptualisation of 
politics in the Anthropocene seems to demand, is a very difficult task. It requires an account 
of how the human and natural remain distinct and yet are related in a non-oppositional, non-
hierarchical way and in so doing encounters a series of problems. In particular, the framing of 
the Anthropocene in terms of the history of human changes to the planet, of the human 
expanding outwards to impact nature, naturalises and extends outwards a liberal humanist 
framework (Jackson 2013: 682). In doing so it shifts attention away from how that natural is 
(also) within the human and the need for a refocusing on what is internal to the subject of 
humanism thereby entailed. 
 
The first risk is that the human becomes naturalised. To say that the human is not ‘outside 
nature’, but ‘within and part of’ the earth system (Maslin and Lewis, 2015: 114), a ‘force of 
nature’ (Hamilton, 2015: 103), part of the geological strata previously considered only as the 
backdrop for human politics, is a move which attempts to displace anthropocentrism. 
However, in doing so it potentially depoliticises the human and obscures the way in which 
the very constitution of the idea of ‘human’ has relied upon and reproduced (some) humans 
as naturalised. The idea of ‘nature’ (and therefore of ‘human’) itself is not innocent, but 
entangled with discourses of race, extinction and geology emerging in the 18th century in 
which black life was treated as a form of animal life (Mirzoeff, 2018); classing (some) 
humans as a ‘part of nature’ is nothing new. 
 
As Giorgio Agamben (2004) has argued, to think in terms of ‘man’ becoming natural, or 
animal, has tended to entail a parallel discourse of having reached the end of history.1 In turn, 
Agamben argues, this discourse entails that there is ‘nothing left but depoliticisation of 
human societies by … the taking on of bare life itself as the supreme political (or rather 
impolitical) task’ (2004: 76). That is, natural life itself and its management is considered 
‘man’s’ last ‘historical task’ and as such is depoliticised - it is ‘without inheritance’ 
(Agamben, 2004: 77). Such an animalisation of the human was for Agamben (2004) 
fundamental to the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and its resonance is particularly 
stark when paired with the framing of the Anthropocene in the apocalyptic terms of the 
earth’s sixth great extinction event (Barnosky et al., 2011).  
 
                                                          
1 I follow Agamben’s use of ‘man’ here to indicate not a neutral/universal humanity but a specific constitution 
of modern subjectivity. 
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In turn, the animalisation of the human changes the political realm such that the political 
becomes concerned precisely with this animalisation - with the zoē that is shared between 
human and animal - and its management (see Shukin, 2009; Wolfe, 2012; Vaughan-Williams, 
2015). The ‘natural’ becomes the subject of (bio)politics2 To simply insist that the nonhuman 
needs to be heard in politics then obscures the ways in which, on this reading, modern 
politics is already engaged in the management of the natural/animal, that is, it ignores the 
constitutive role of the exclusion of nature and the nonhuman (Ruddick, 2015: 1121). 
 
Biopolitics structures the interaction of and distinction between human and nature in a very 
particular way and if this biopolitics is our politics then seeking to ‘hear’ the natural/animal 
within it is a difficult task. The discourse of granting ‘rights’ or ‘sovereignty’ to nature or 
animals then runs the risk of bringing those categories more explicitly within the biopolitical 
structures of which they are already a part.3 In focusing once again on an unexamined 
‘human’ and its outside, it also fails to recognise the limitations and exclusions integral to the 
concept of the human. As Jackson (2013: 678) has argued, it is not enough to ‘bring animals 
in’, because black is devalued beyond animal; casting the animal as the opposable limit of the 
human draws on a discourse of species shaped by a discourse of race (see also Wynter, 
2003).  
 
The natural then is already established within our current political structures. Rosi Braidotti’s 
(2013) account of the posthuman and the animal demonstrates how they already share spaces, 
roles and marginalisations; advanced capitalism does not rely on anthropocentrism, but in 
fact contributes to its displacement by marketing and profiting from the biogenetic structures 
of (especially animal) life itself (Braidotti, 2013: 76). Wakefield (2014) extends this 
argument beyond animalisation and a focus on zoē to demonstrate the ways in which the 
inhuman is incorporated into discourses of resilience. Naturalising the human as either 
biological or geological both potentially play into historical narratives about the ‘end of man’ 
and thereby obscure the very specific reproductions of the subject that are taking place in so 
doing.  
 
This leads to the second risk that Anthropocene-inflected rethinkings of the human/nature 
relationship encounter; that human and nature become produced as indistinguishable. ‘Post-
natural’ approaches turn their focus to destabilising the ‘modern’ account of nature as a ‘pure, 
singular, and stable’ domain (Lorimer, 2012 in Lövbrand et al, 2015: 215) through 
demonstrating the cultural construction of the category of nature, and in turn of the human. 
The difficulty here is that modern politics, and the production of the modern subject, is 
already constructed as a response to the instability and constructed nature of the distinction 
between the human and natural; the modern account of nature is the solution to a prior 
modern construction of the indistinction between human and natural as a problem.  
 
To escape such a narrative and reframe the interrelation of the human and natural is then a 
difficult task, and much more than a claim that all life is part of a complex ecosystem and can 
                                                          
2 Clark and Yusoff (2017) argue that there is reason to be cautious about a biopolitical approach to analysis of 
the Anthropocene because it fails to take into account the geological reframing of ‘nature’. The biopolitical 
focus on the life/death interface does not necessarily illuminate the politics of the life/non-life interface 
(Povinelli, 2016). However, for the purposes of the argument being made here there are some shared features of 
a biopolitical and a geontopolitical analysis that are important, in that they both highlight the politics of the 
mobile borders of the modern human subject and the difficulty in thinking outside these. 
3 It should be noted that many instances of attempts to grant rights to nature are strategic interventions designed 
to reflect Indigenous world views, which means that they also contain potential for destabilising biopolitical 
structures. See e.g. Povinelli , 2016. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
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no longer be separated out. Because of course it could never be easily separated out; attempts 
to categorise and distinguish the human and natural have always been political cuts which 
simultaneously produce the human and natural. To say that everything is both human and 
natural is precisely the ground on which Agamben’s anthropological machine operates; 
acknowledging exactly this, and in response drawing a limit within the figure of the human to 
contain those simultaneous identities; ‘The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic 
and animal, animal and human, therefore passes first of all as a mobile border within living 
man … it is possible to oppose man to other living things … only because something like an 
animal life has already been separated within man.’ (Agamben, 2004:15).  
 
It is not, then, that the concepts of self and other fade away (Harrington, 2016) and 
‘subject/object distinctions break down’ (Lövbrand et al, 2015: 213) if we follow through the 
argument that the Anthropocene requires us to conceptualise everything as simultaneously 
human and natural, rather that such an approach to the human and natural is what makes the 
inscription of self and other possible. The simultaneity of the human and natural is, on 
Agamben’s account, not a neutral combination but rather one whose acknowledgement leads 
to the necessity for the inscription of a hierarchical boundary between them. The modern 
subject is already produced as simultaneously human and natural, and this has not been a 
progressive move, either for those classed as human or nature.  
 
If we do not want to do away with the categories of human/nature and develop a flat ontology 
which either humanises nature or naturalises the human (as above), then as Corry (2017) 
argues, one alternative is to retain an analytical distinction between the human and natural 
whilst acknowledging that the contents of both categories can change. I seek in the following 
sections to trace the mobility of this distinction, not at the outer edges of the human but, as 
Agamben (2004: 92) calls for, within it: ‘To render inoperative the machine that governs our 
conception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek new – more effective or more 
authentic – articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that – within 
man – separates man and animal’.  
 
So, whilst bringing into focus the problematic nature of the separation of the human and 
natural is important in trying to conceptualise the world of the Anthropocene, it also risks 
being co-opted into already-existing frameworks that rely precisely on the indistinction 
between human and natural. To say that what is ‘new’ is (a recognition of the fact that) that 
there is no pure nature (anymore) ignores the argument that the indistinction, and 
corresponding production of distinction, between nature/culture has been characteristic of 
Western politics and its practices of racial distinction, colonisation and exclusion (Agamben, 
2005; Mirzoeff, 2016; Ruddick, 2015; Youatt, 2014).  
 
Rafi Youatt (2014) has responded to this challenge by putting forward an argument that 
because politics has always relied on the concepts of nature and animal it should not be 
conceived as a human activity. This means that the Anthropocene demands not just 
rethinking participants in politics but rethinking the nature of politics itself. Seeking to offer 
recognition or welcome to nonlife entities within ‘our’ dominant political structures 
maintains that politics as a human activity and, as Povinelli (2017: 180) argues, ‘forecloses 
the possibility of them [nonlife entities] provincializing us’. 
 
If we accept that the natural has always been part of ‘our’ politics, and that such a positioning 
has domesticated the disruptive potential of that ‘natural’, then a shift of emphasis is required 
when thinking about bringing other voices and actors into politics. The problem becomes not 
 
7 
one of whether the natural is part of our political landscape, but how. To change that ‘how’ is, 
I think, a much more difficult task than the simpler one of addition. To respond to 
imperatives to think through how other voices might be engaged (as in Youatt, 2014; Burke 
et al, 2016) requires, among other things, an exploration of the temporal structures within 
which current sedimentations of the mobile border between human and nonhuman operate.  
 
Moreover, if the task at hand is to rethink our political categories then this also requires 
revisiting the temporal frameworks on which they rest. Dominant political categories and 
concepts are reliant on and reproduce a peculiarly modern temporality. Concepts such as 
sovereignty and rights rely on particular temporalisations (Hutchings, 2008; Davis, 2008), 
and concepts of species, the human and the natural rely on particular colonial histories 
(Mirzoeff, 2018; Wynter, 2003); to rethink political categories thus requires an interrogation 
of temporal categories.  
 
The concept of the Anthropocene seems to demand a particular historical consciousness in 
order to demarcate it and assess its significance. As I will elaborate below, it relies upon both 
geological and historical periodization, which Kathleen Davis (2008) has argued is central to 
the identification and diagnosis of our present times and to the political possibilities thereby 
legitimised. The dominant contexts in which it is mobilised as a call for action reproduce the 
human as active historical agent. It is difficult to mobilise the Anthropocene in the service of 
undoing the figure of the modern political subject because it is enmeshed and operationalized 
within a series of temporal and historical assumptions which continually reproduce that 
figure; as Constantin Fasolt (2004: 9) has argued, the modern subject is a product of the same 
act by which the past and present are distinguished. It is this difficulty that I go on to explore 
below. 
 
The Politics of Dating the Anthropocene 
 
The current reliance on the concept of the Anthropocene as a starting point for rethinking 
how the natural, animal, or nonhuman is brought into politics is both important and limiting. 
It is important that the effects of the Anthropocene on what we have considered natural time 
and natural conditions as the backdrop for human development are articulated. To treat the 
Anthropocene as ‘business as usual’ in climatic terms plays directly into the hands of 
ecomodernist arguments that we can manage change through more sophisticated technology 
or economic growth, that is, using the same techniques that have been deployed in the 
Holocene. As Clive Hamilton (2015) has pointed out, such responses rely on assumptions 
about, and experience of, the resilience of natural systems which is precisely the Holocene 
‘environmental’ feature that the Anthropocene puts into question. However, employing the 
concept of the Anthropocene as a frame within which to rethink how nature or the nonhuman 
might be brought into politics is somewhat limiting because the Anthropocene concept itself 
tells a particular story about human time and natural time that places nature in a specific 
relation to human politics.  
 
The discourse of the relationship between time and subjectivity in relation to the concept of 
the Anthropocene emerges on two different levels. The first is the specific debate about the 
appropriate starting date for the Anthropocene which I discuss below and the second is the 
broader reliance on the conceptual tools of starting points and epochalisation themselves 




There are a number of current suggestions for dating the Anthropocene. Crutzen and 
Stoermer’s (2000) formulation of the concept takes the industrial revolution as the turning 
point for anthropogenic effects on the earth’s climate and this date, or a mid-20th century date 
of the great acceleration, remain, largely, the most popular views (Hamilton 2015; 
Chakrabarty, 2009; Steffen et al, 2015; Veland and Lynch, 2016; Waters et al, 2015). The 
current recommendation from the Anthropocene Working Group is 16 July 1945, the date of 
the first atomic bomb test (Ruddiman et al, 2018). There are however, as Autin and Holbrook 
(2012) have noted, other contenders; Ruddiman (in Autin and Holbrook, 2012: 60) suggests 
the advent of subsistence settlement, animal domestication and cultivation agriculture. Other 
approaches align the Anthropocene with the impact of fire, pre-industrial farming, 
colonization or sociometabolism (Lewis and Maslin, 2015).  
 
However, as Veland and Lynch (2016: 2) point out, to delineate an Anthropocene epoch we 
need to find indicators ‘that will span global spatial scales, and geologic timescales’. That is, 
as the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (2017) (the body responsible for formally 
ratifying changes to the Geologic Time Scale) puts it ‘it is a central precept in 
chronostratigraphy that the boundaries defined are always isochronous surfaces, i.e. they are 
the same time everywhere. In other words, all divisions begin and end at precisely the same 
point in time throughout the World’. Lewis and Maslin have argued that none of the starting 
dates put forward so far meets these criteria because they are not derived from a globally 
synchronous marker. They argue instead for the Orbis dip in 1610, a dip in CO2 caused by the 
large decline in human numbers and the regeneration of forest due to the deaths of 
Indigenous people in the Americas as a result of colonization (Lewis and Maslin, 2015).  
 
Different starting dates reflect assumptions about which humans and which social and 
political configurations are associated with the advent of the geological period in which we 
now find ourselves. A number of authors challenge the ‘recent’ dating of the Anthropocene, 
arguing that it is not the ‘new’ age of ‘the human’, but the continuation or mutation of longer 
histories of capital, patriarchy, racism or colonisation (Davis and Todd 2017; Mirzoeff, 2018; 
Moore, 2017; Haraway, 2015; Raworth, 2014, Verges, 2017). Kyle Whyte (2018: 771), for 
example, argues that Indigenous people have been living with what we might call the effects 
of the anthropocene—forced displacement, adaptation to new climates, new ecosystems, new 
plants and animals—for some time, leading him to claim that the Anthropocene is not a break 
with previous eras, but a ‘continuation of practices of dispossession and genocide over the 
last five hundred years’.  
 
Clearly, then, each of these temporal and material markers has implications for how we 
conceive of who is responsible for, who has historical agency in regard to, and what political 
solutions are available to address the challenges of the Anthropocene. Davis and Todd (2017: 
763) have argued, for example, that the 1610 date not only foregrounds the responsibility of 
colonization for contemporary environmental crisis but in so doing reframes how we 
understand what that contemporary crisis is: as Sharpe (2016: 5) puts it ‘transatlantic slavery 
was and is the disaster’. Such a dating, Davis and Todd (2017: 776) continue, means that we 
need to understand environmental crisis in terms of the ‘severing of relations’ through the 
brutality of colonialism combined with universalising imperialistic logic. In turn, political 
solutions entail ‘re-evaluating not just our energy use, but our modes of governance, ongoing 
racial injustice, and our understandings of ourselves as human’ (Davis and Todd, 2017: 776). 
 
This debate about starting dates points to a disjuncture within the Anthropocene concept. On 
the one hand, different starting dates indicate quite specific features of some human societies 
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as the important elements. On the other hand, the mobilisation of the Anthropocene concept 
and the mechanisms of geological dating through which it emerges necessitate species level 
and planetary claims.  
 
On one level the turn to species thinking can be explained by a difference in 
cause/responsibility and effect, the argument being that while perhaps it has not been the 
human as species that has caused the Anthropocene, it is the human as species that it now 
threatens. However, many of these same authors have pointed out that the ways in which the 
effects of the Anthropocene are being/will be experienced are not evenly distributed among 
the human species. Moreover, as Chakrabarty (2009: 217) asks, ‘If the industrial way of life 
was what got us into this crisis, then the question is, why think in terms of species, surely a 
category that belongs to a much longer history?’. His argument is that we need to think both 
in terms of the history of capital, and in terms of the importance of ecological 
interconnections and parameters for species existence which the Anthropocene brings into 
view (2009: 220).  
 
But avoiding the pitfalls of universalising thought warned against by Chakrabarty and others 
is a particularly difficult path to tread in the case of conceptualising the Anthropocene. The 
very idea of the Anthropocene as a unified geologic stratum necessarily names humans as a 
collective (Yusoff, 2013) and that collective in turn takes on a specific colouration whereby 
the species is understood in terms determined by the Anthropocene start date. The threat of 
extinction posed by the Anthropocene, a seemingly paradigmatic example of a species-level 
effect regardless of cause or start date in fact posits a quite particular characterisation of that 
species. As Yusoff (2013: 783) argues, ‘Implicit within the use of CO2 as the material trace 
of the Anthropocene is the designation of a politicised stratigraphy composed through the 
event of carbon capitalism from the 1800s’; what is to be extinguished is therefore the subject 
of late capitalism.  
 
It seems that the timescale of dominant Anthropocene starting dates (in Chakrabarty’s 
argument, the timescale of capital) imposes itself on any attempt to consider species level 
timescales. This is a seeming tension between a geological history which focuses on 
synchronous planetary markers and species level effects, and a human history which seeks to 
disaggregate and determine the specifics of cause and effect. The challenge of the 
‘Anthropocene moment’ (Szerszynski, 2017: 118) is to negotiate the relationship between 
these histories. 
 
A number of commentators (Lövbrand et al, 2015; Maslin and Lewis, 2015) have argued that 
this negotiation can be resolved by the use of multiple definitions and interpretations of the 
Anthropocene. That is, Maslin and Lewis argue, the problems with universalism associated 
with the geological search for a golden spike and focus on starting dates do not have to 
impact on other disciplines. But it is difficult to see how the Anthropocene concept can be so 
easily divorced from its geological origins, and its association with claims about epochs and 
assumptions about time, history and subjectivity entailed therein.  
 
Moreover, the dominant adoption of an Anthropocene start date related to the industrial 
revolution or atomic testing itself works to collapse histories of species and capital because 
both the ability to identify these specific events as historically important and the history of 
species seemingly offering a contending view draw on the same intellectual history and 
resources. Histories of species and histories of capital are not necessarily opposed to one 
another: the concepts emerged at the same time and are products of the same intellectual 
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resources (Mirzoeff, 2018; Wynter, 2003). Thinking in terms of histories and timescales of 
colonialism, on the other hand, potentially opens up a critique of the concept of species 
alongside a different articulation of starting points. That is, the relationship between species 
thinking and thinking in terms of human histories differs depending on the starting dates 
employed to discuss the Anthropocene; one tends to naturalise species thinking while another 
opens up a critique of it.  
 
To return to the question of bringing nature or the non-human into politics, the current debate 
around appropriate starting dates for the Anthropocene then tends to reproduce a modern 
account of the human subject, and so, arguably, of human politics, which returns us to the 
difficulties outlined above in reconsidering the role of the non-human in that politics. 
However, my suggestion is that one cause of this difficulty runs deeper than the well 
documented universalization of particularistic accounts of the human that emerge as soon as 
any one starting date for the Anthropocene is proposed. It is also an effect of the way in 
which the very designation of the Anthropocene epoch reproduces a particularly modern 
temporality and, relatedly, the reproduction of a larger narrative which dissipates any 
tensions between human time and natural time, by relying on a familiar account of their 
interrelation. These are the issues I turn to in the following sections. 
 
The Politics of Epochalisation: Historical and Geological 
 
The question of what times we are in has implications, as indicated in the previous section, 
for deciding how we might best act in those times. However, the consideration of the 
historical meaning of the present that we can see in such attempts to ‘diagnose the times’ as 
an Anthropocene epoch also reproduces a modern understanding of history and temporality 
as can been seen in its reliance on themes of novelty, transition, acceleration, progression and 
periodization (Osborne, 1995; Kosselleck, 2004). In seeking to transpose debates about the 
geological epoch of the Anthropocene onto the social world a modern conceptual vocabulary 
is mobilised. In this section I argue that we need to critically reconsider starting points and 
epochalisation themselves because such conceptual structures invoke particular accounts of 
history and progress with particular consequences for rethinking the political subject of the 
Anthropocene.  
 
While treating the Anthropocene as a new epoch might be relatively straightforward in 
geological terms, transposing this temporalisation onto the social world needs careful 
handling. Geological time is not a neutral container: as Szerszynski (2017: 115) points out, 
the geology of earth systems as established in the early 19th century is a product of the same 
modern episteme as the claims about political subjectivity that this new geological epoch is 
tasked with putting into question. To assume that adopting a geological timeline requires or 
prompts either a reconsideration of the modern subject and its politics, or the historical 
narratives upon which these rely, ignores the broader 19th century context of line-drawing 
practices that simultaneously enabled accounts of geology, history, race, colonization, and 
subjectivity (see e.g. Mirzoeff, 2018; Wynter, 2003). All rely on the same approach to time 
and history which allows for epochal claims to be made, and the particular mobilisation of 
geology in the discourse of the anthropocene does not escape these problems. 
 
There are two interrelated implications of the Anthropocene debate’s embeddedness within 
modern temporal narratives for the consideration of other voices in Anthropocene politics; 
one temporal and one spatial. To address the temporal, I draw on Kimberley Hutchings’s 
account of the relationship between chronos and kairos in world political time to argue that in 
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conceptualising the Anthropocene as epoch, the modern human/nature dichotomy is 
reproduced in the temporal realm.  
 
Hutchings draws on Agamben to demonstrate how the modern progressive account of 
temporality relies on two qualitatively specific conceptions of time working simultaneously 
(2008: 7). On the one hand, the narrative of periodization and progress relies on a chronotic 
conception of time as linear, universal and irreversible (Hutchings, 2008: 6); this is the 
geological time invoked in claims about the Anthropocene as ‘scalable, correlatable, 
measurable’ (Zalasiewicz et al, 2017: 97). On the other hand, this temporal account 
simultaneously relies on a kairotic understanding of time to produce distinctions between 
qualitatively different times in human history, which allows for conceiving of beginnings, 
endings, novelty, repetition, stasis and change (Hutchings, 2008: 6). This is the time of 
History, relied upon to make claims about epochal starting dates, in which certain times are 
more or less significant.  
 
It is kairotic ordering which enables politics because it directs and grounds the relationship 
between the present and the future (Hutchings, 2008: 156) without which no political project 
could be conceived. In Western thought then, as Hutchings (2008: 156) shows, chronos is a 
threat to politics; the dominant Western account of politics assumes that it is about 
controlling and directing time as chronos. In order for there to be politics, for times to have 
meaning and direction, to be able to grasp that meaning and intervene in its trajectory, for the 
present to be understood as such, for plans, progress and visions of the future to be possible 
chronos must be given kairotic shape (Hutchings, 2008: 127). Politics, on this account is 
centrally concerned with shaping and controlling natural time rather than excluding it, hence 
the difficulties with ‘bringing nature into’ politics.  
 
Kairotic temporality relies on and reproduces a vantage point of a singular present, or at least 
a singular significant present, because it is through an identification of that present and its 
meaning that historical significance can be retroactively assigned. A unitary history and a 
unitary present are integral to modern politics and provide the metric by which ‘the’ global 
present is differentially inhabited (see Chakrabarty, 2007); temporal plurality is obscured on 
this account. What Chakrabarty calls the parochial temporality of Europe, and Hutchings 
calls the globalisation of capitalism are positioned as the universal time of the present. Other 
temporalities might exist, but they are not politically or historically important; they do not 
drive the direction of world history as a whole (Hutchings, 2008: 159).  
 
The problem here is twofold. Firstly, the Anthropocene claim that there is no natural anymore 
and the related argument that nature is now inserted into human politics and vice versa 
obscures the relationship between human and natural time which has been a defining 
characteristic of the modern assumptions claimed to have been the cause of the 
Anthropocene. There of course never was any ‘natural’, only cuts made in distinguishing the 
political from the nonpolitical through claims, in this instance, about temporality. To imagine 
that the human has shaped natural time is a modern position par excellance. To go further 
and try to imagine the human as now part of natural time seems more promising, until we see 
that the natural time relied upon in this move (the time of geological epochs) has already 
been given kairotic shape, and transposed into historical, and so political, time.  
 
Secondly, as Fasolt (2004: xviii) has argued, historical evidence is distinguished by the 
assumption that a person is responsible for the traces that comprise such evidence—this is 
how we gain knowledge of the past. In making this assumption history determines what 
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counts as political, or to transpose into Hutchings’s terms, what matters for diagnosing world 
political time. The centrality of an active responsible subject to the historical endeavour, the 
idea that ‘someone must be responsible, and someone must be free’ Fasolt argues, makes a 
politics of liberty, responsibility and progress seem natural, while others are ruled out as 
nonpolitical (2004: xviii). The mobilisation of the concept of the Anthropocene then, rather 
than offering geological time as an alternative or departure, in large part reinscribes 
geological time within an account of historical time which in turn naturalises the very politics 
which such mobilisations seek to critique. 
 
The Production of Anachronism 
 
The second implication of the Anthropocene epoch concept’s indebtedness to modern 
temporal structures and the doubled account of (chronotic and kairotic) time therein is the 
(re)production of spatial anachronism produced by these structures. The modern account of 
historical time is one which is unitary and progressive; it is also one in which different times 
can (and must) exist at the same time (Koselleck, 2004: 2). Simultaneous historical ‘nows’ 
cannot be accommodated on the timeline of unidirectional progress, so those differences are 
rendered in terms of occupying an earlier position on the historical timeline. The 
chronologically synchronous, on the modern temporal account, does not map on to the 
historically synchronous.  
 
Different places can experience different times, qualitatively speaking, at the same 
chronological time, but those times are directionally and progressively ordered through a 
kairotic account of temporality. This doubling is the modern solution to the problem of 
different levels of historical development occurring chronologically simultaneously (Davis, 
2008: 133) and is what makes space mappable onto the kairotic timeline of development: 
hence the colonial gaze through which looking elsewhere (underdeveloped states) becomes 
looking backwards. 
 
Place, time and political difference thus become inextricably linked in the modern 
imagination, and while claims about epochalisation and periodization in relation to the 
Anthropocene seem at first to be temporal claims, their political significance arguably 
emerges through the ‘repressed spatial premises’ (Osborne, 1995: 16) of the concept of 
modernity to which they are indebted. Looking elsewhere as looking backwards, on this 
reading, is not a move that neutrally maps differences in times. Such a directional and 
progressive account of temporality relies on what Bruno Latour (2015: 3) calls the modern 
‘arrow of time’, which ‘orients action in a highly specific way and gives to the future a very 
specific coloration of emancipation and to the past a sense of stagnant archaism’.  
 
The implications of this for thinking about the Anthropocene are on one level fairly obvious: 
the claim that the now is the time of the Anthropocene is a claim about a specific now 
inhabited by a specific and small subset of the planet. Elsewhere is the past, and that past’s 
future can only be ‘our’ now. It offers neither an alternative model nor a challenge to ‘our’ 
politics or characterisation of the now. Existing alternatives can only be seen as a precursor to 
our ‘now’; they cannot offer alternative futures. Political difference, on this reading, is 
reframed as anachronism. This is the basis of the argument that the non-West should be 
partially exempt from emissions targets because they should be allowed to ‘catch up’, while 
the West leads the way in terms of what comes next in managing, reducing, or offering a 
geoengineering solution to those emissions. The implications of this structure of temporal 
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othering in retrospective mode are well-rehearsed: the labelling of those who resist as 
‘backward’ so excluded from politics (e.g. Latour, 2015; Povinelli, 2017).  
 
However, to go back to Latour’s arrow of time, it is not only the colouration of the past 
which is determined by the directionality of modern temporality, but also the future. 
Alternative approaches to the complexities of planetary imagination in the light of the 
Anthropocene tend to seek not to engage with the elsewhere as the past, but instead to point 
to it as offering resources for different imaginaries of the future, or future alternatives to the 
problematic model of industrial development. This seemingly more progressive stance is, 
however, similarly in debt to the modern structure of temporal distancing in relation to place, 
albeit in prospective rather than retrospective mode; elsewhere offers a representation of the 
future within the present (Osborne, 1995). There is a continuity of the basic temporal 
structure of historical self-definition and projection in which spatial others cannot be ‘now’, 
and cannot engage in the politics of the now. They may provide inspiration, imaginative 
resource, minor storylines, but their time is not the world historical time that is of relevance 
for progressive political projects, and nor can it be while the Anthropocene narrative remains 
embedded in the periodizing temporal structures of modernity. 
 
The implication of anachronism is that rather than being able to see different knowledges and 
ontologies—Indigenous knowledges for example—as different they are instead translated 
into ‘our’ social grid of understanding (Povinelli, 2016: 154). As Chandler and Reid have 
argued, treating indigenous knowledge as a resource to teach us adaptation and resilience in 
the face of environmental change does not provincialize dominant western hegemonic 
practices (2018: 252). Rather than being disturbed or challenged by different articulations of 
the present it instead repackages such knowledge in the service of more effective governing 
practices (Chandler and Reid, 2018: 252). For those from whom we are seeking to ‘learn’ in 
order to avoid harm such a temporal ordering has deeply problematic implications. Framing 
Indigenous people as living in a ‘good’ relationship with nature, as Whyte (2018: 236) has 
argued, implies that the ancestors of Indigenous people ‘were not fully harmed through 
colonial, capitalist and industrial drivers of the climate crisis’. There is, he continues, no 
‘Indigenous remnant unaffected by domination’ (Whyte, 2018: 237).  
 
More broadly, the conflation of place, time and political difference means that different 
ontologies become produced as temporal difference. Ontologies that depart from 
enlightenment structures of rationality cannot form the basis for effective political claims. Of 
particular resonance in light of the Anthropocene debate, a number of authors have offered 
accounts of alternative Indigenous ontological claims as regards the interrelation of life/non-
life in which land and thought are integral to one another: ‘our truth … in a majority of 
Indigenous societies, conceives that we (humans) are made from the land; our flesh is 
literally an extension of soil’ (Watts, 2013 in Davis and Todd, 2017: 769). However, in order 
to make effective political claims Povinelli shows how such differences need to be rendered 
historically – as primitive or past. For example, Indigenous populations need to frame this 
relationship between human and land in historical terms in disputes about land rights, 
meaning that ‘Major social and analytic accomplishments that allowed people to survive the 
present [have] to be presented as a dumb totemic representation of the past’ (Povnelli, 2016: 
80).  
 
The spatio-temporal delimitation of the contours of politics then is one result of the 
directional and progressive temporality required in order to be able to make claims about the 
Anthropocene as period or epoch. However, such claims not only exclude what is other, but 
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in so doing produce what is proper to politics; they are not (only) reflective of already-
existing difference in the world but they produce temporal difference. Kathleen Davis’s 
(2008) work on the periodization of the medieval and modern provides one way to 
interrogate the implications of such production for thinking critically about mobilisations of 
the Anthropocene concept, by treating periodization as a political tool.  
 
Periodized, progressive history does not reflect a distinction between periods, Davis (2008) 
argues, but creates one, and does so for particular political ends. Her focus is the 
medieval/modern periodization between which she argues there is no clear distinction; the 
distinction was/is a political tool used precisely to exclude unwanted elements or problems of 
European ‘modernity’ from political discussion (2008: 8). The timing of the specific self-
identification of modernity, she continues, was no coincidence: ‘at the very moment the 
colonial slave trade began to soar feudal law and slavery were grouped together and 
identified as a characteristic of Europe’s past and of a non-European present’ (Davis, 2008: 
8). Periodization, on this reading, is a mechanism which allowed for the transfer of the slave 
trade to a brutal past.  
 
Davis’s approach is important for engaging with the Anthropocene because while, as above, 
the way in which periodization excludes particular elements from the (political) present and 
partitions off the past and the elsewhere is relatively well-rehearsed, her approach adds an 
injunction to consider displacement. It is not, on this reading, simply that other ‘nows’ cannot 
be accommodated and so are dismissed, but that the identification and content of the world-
historical present — the main storyline — in making other places ‘past’ uses this demarcation 
to obscure and displace elements integral to its own functioning. This opens up the question 
of what is being displaced in seeking to demarcate the Anthropocene. One initial observation 
is that it is only as industrial production moves out of the west that the Anthropocene is 
identified, at least in the popular imagination, as that which follows after industrialisation. 
Industrial production is thus produced as part of the West’s past, and the non-West’s present. 
But industrial production, its problematic labour practices and disposal of its by-products 
remain integral to Western economies and ways of life; they are not past but displaced and 
outsourced.  
 
The concern here is that a series of deeply problematic elements of contemporary western 
political and economic structures become framed as past and so excluded from political 
discussion when in fact they are potentially peaking, albeit elsewhere. Issues such as 
workers’ rights, exploitation, unsafe working practices, poverty, waste disposal and so on are 
transformed into issues of ‘our’ past and of an elsewhere’s, backwards, present; these are 
problems associated with industrialisation, and the West is post-industrial. Indeed, it is only 
from the post-industrial vantage point that the Anthropocene can be discerned: the claim that 
there is no natural anymore can only be made on the back of the industrial fabrication of the 
separation of human and nature. To claim globally that there is no natural anymore 
immediately renders the human/nature separation a historical marker through which ‘other’ 
places must pass if they are to progress through historical development.  
 
Similarly, the narratives of dystopian futures used to animate calls for action on 
environmental issues displaces elements integral to the functioning of those places that are 
rendered part of the world historical present. As Whyte (2018: 226) argues, the things that 
nonIndigenous people dread about future of climate crisis are the ones that Indigenous people 
have endured already. Making these crises future concerns marginalises the history of 
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colonialism, the continued inequalities, practices and implications of which the functioning of 
those places inhabiting the ‘world historical present’ relies upon. 
 
The necessary, geological, framing of the Anthropocene as global and globally synchronous 
underscores its claim to represent the world historical present. Issues of inequality, human 
rights, and injustice then become possible to displace and sideline as problems that are either 
past and elsewhere, or yet to come—they are old news in this new world of the 
Anthropocene, or part of dystopian future imaginaries. To return to the opening discussion of 
debates around the need to bring the non-human in to politics, I suggest that the exploration 
of these implications of periodization and epochalisation indicates a need also to bring the 
human into that politics. By this I mean a return to a focus on postcolonial, racial and global 
justice struggles which are produced as parochial, anachronistic, or out of date when read 
alongside claims about the new scale of planetary existential threat in the Anthropocene. The 
exclusion of the non-human and the exclusion of the human from politics are inextricably 
linked and neither are challenged by an Anthropocene discourse framed as another 
manifestation of the modern project of spatio-temporal epochalisation.    
 
Plural Pasts, Plural Humans 
 
The problems with which we are left are how to engage with the multiplicities (of scale, time, 
and actors) gestured to by the Anthropocene concept in the light of its embeddedness in 
modern temporal structures. Claims about human geological activity rely on temporal 
structures that anchor us to a modern political imagination which only allows for one account 
of temporality (an account which already contains the human and natural within it). We 
cannot engage with other (human or non-human) voices unless we also open up space to 
engage with different temporalities and worlds in which those voices have meaning.   
 
The seeming disjuncture between geological activity and political passivity noted at the start 
of the article in fact reflects two sides of the same coin; it is precisely the framing of the 
human in terms of geological agency and the associated accounts of temporality that this 
reproduces which provides an (intensely political) set of limits on the political questions 
proper to the times, ones which cannot engage creatively with the ecological problems that 
the Anthropocene concept is mobilised to highlight. How then might we loosen the anchor 
points of our world in order that we might be able to be responsive to the plurality of worlds, 
to multiple ‘now’s, human and inhuman?  
 
Looking outside the human, and towards the future, whilst seemingly responsive to the 
challenges of scale posed by the Anthropocene, in fact relies on and reproduces the 
organising logic of human/natural which provides a unified temporal scale. In our haste to 
escape anthropocentrism by seeking to engage with or reconfigure politics around the non-
human there is a danger, as I have shown, that its central claims and effects get both 
reproduced and obscured because the construction of that non-human is already part of 
anthropocentric politics. To seek to escape anthropocentrism and look elsewhere (the non-
human) in reconfiguring politics for the Anthropocene is problematic because that elsewhere 
is only constructed as such through the inscription of an exclusionary border within the 
modern subject. Similarly, looking towards the future within the framework of epochal 
thinking that currently dominates the Anthropocene debate determines that future within a 
progressive kairotic ordering principle. Looking forward does not engage with different 





I suggest one way to open up possibilities of thinking multiple times, scales and worlds is not 
to look directly to plural futures or to expanding political structures or accounts of political 
community to include non-humans, but to start instead with attempts to articulate plural pasts, 
to revisit ‘commonsensical’ understandings of the intersections of geological and historical 
time which underpin dominant formulations of the human as species. That is, to look 
backwards and inwards as a counterpoint to the dominant discourse of the meaning and 
implications of the Anthropocene with its vocabulary of what will have been and the 
associated expansive conception of the human (see Colebrook, 2017; Yusoff, 2014).  
 
The accounts of plural pasts gestured to above in debates about starting dates offers one route 
through which accounts of the human reliant upon linear conceptions of time might be 
destabilised. Highlighting the link between the Anthropocene and histories of colonialism 
shifts attention to the erasure of multiple temporalities and associated exclusionary accounts 
of the human upon which colonialism relies. The ‘end’ of the Native American world, for 
example, is on one account (the argument for the 1610 starting date) what allows us to 
perceive the Anthropocene (Whyte, 2018: 226). This account of the past entails a different 
characterisation of the present, which suggests that we live in multiple times and worlds. On 
this account the disaster of the Anthropocene is not coming, but has already occurred; ‘Native 
Americans have seen the end of their respective worlds’ (Gross, 2014 in Whyte, 2018: 227). 
The present in which Native Americans live is already marked by ongoing ecological (and 
other) disaster, their now entails living with the ends of their worlds in resistant ways, 
fostering ‘relationships to humans, other-than-humans and land today’ (Davis and Todd, 
2017: 772). 
 
Offering a different account of the present in and of itself does not, as I have shown above, 
challenge the broader assumptions on which the Anthropocene discourse rests; it remains 
difficult to allow for multiple ‘world historical’ presents on the timescales the Anthropocene 
imposes. However, being attentive to alternative constructions of the ‘now’ also points to 
broader possibilities for rethinking these temporal structures, and particularly for challenging 
the relationship between past, present and future which renders alternative presents only 
marginal storylines.  
 
Elizabeth Povinelli’s work is instructive in this regard. She offers an account of Indigenous 
ontology which relies on the overlapping of past, present and future particularly in concepts 
of origins; ancestors are not ‘past’ but present, the dead and the living are in the same time 
and space (2016: 76). Similarly, Kyle Whyte (2018: 229) describes the Anishinaabe 
perspective, in which ‘current’ generations conceive themselves to be living alongside future 
and past relatives simultaneously. Ancestors and future generations offer articulations of 
being otherwise that are put in dialogue with the present (2018: 230). This gives rise to a 
spiralling account of time with forward motion that can be predictable and irregular (Whyte 
2018: 229). This is in stark contrast to the temporality characterised by Latour’s ‘arrow of 
time’: the past is no longer stagnant and the future no longer progressive. Such accounts of 
temporality are challenging because rather than offering an alternative kairotic ordering 
principle they offer a different account of the relationship between chronos and kairos which 
is what opens up the possibility of thinking otherwise about the human/nature distinction. In 
Povinelli’s folded account of temporality ‘humans are and can become nonhuman agents’, 




With the destabilisation of origins in mind, the geological timescales that the Anthropocene 
opens up can also be employed to revisit anthropocentrism and refocus on the mobility of the 
border between the human and non-human within the modern subject. Rather than seeking to 
move outside the human as such this shift would destabilise the category from within; the 
geological timescales opened up by the Anthropocene can also be used to put into question 
the species ‘we’ that dominant narratives of the Anthropocene rely on and reproduce. While 
authors such as Mirzoeff (2018: 18) urge a move away from species thinking because of its 
association with race, discussed above, engaging different temporalities found within the 
concept of species might also offer resources for a reorientation of the discourse of species. 
Such a lens highlights that species is multiple, and is not necessarily progressive; the human 
as ‘special’ begins to unravel and with it the exclusionary accounts of a progressive, unitary 
history with which it is enmeshed.  
 
The geological scale opened up by the Anthropocene gestures not only to the scaling-up of 
thought, but also to a scaling down, to looking within the human. While a focus on the human 
as planetary agent reinscribes modern accounts of the human and the human/nature divide, as 
I have shown, interrogating accounts of origins has the potential to destabilise this account 
(see Yusoff, 2013). Such a focus, as found in contemporary human origins theory (e.g. 
Stringer, 2011) offers a spectral refashioning of the human as interspecies, inhabiting human 
and non-human (e.g. Neanderthal) time. The story of Homo sapiens emerging in Africa and 
then colonising the globe, wiping out all other human species in its path now looks more 
complicated: residual traces of other human genes found in modern humans suggest 
differential genetic intermingling (Kaplan, 2011). 
 
An interspecies account shows how the non-human is not just part of our politics by 
exclusion, but within the human, and begins the work of unpicking the modern account of 
that human. It also undoes the idea of there being one history or one time for that species, and 
by extension for the planet considered as their homeland. The human on this account contains 
multiple temporalities within it; Neanderthal genetic traces suggest that rather than thinking 
of extinction as a future event marking the progressive culmination of human history, that 
such extinction is already part of the human species. The mobile border between the human 
and non-human within the modern subject is also a marker of different temporalities: there is 
not one time or world in which the human lives because it already both lives and is extinct, it 
already occupies more than one history.  
 
Perhaps, then what is needed is a cautious return to a critical anthropocentrism as a site from 
which to examine the human, to challenge the Anthropocene’s potential to be read in terms of 
an ecomodernist call to arms by turning its invocation of geological time and human agency 
against itself; the human is indeed a geological agent, but neither that human, nor the 
geologic timescales upon which it is now conceived as operating, will have been quite what 
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